Dissertation
The Party Politics of Political Decentralization
Since the 1970s, several Western European democracies have devolved substantial decision-making powers to sub-national governments, some for the first time. Why do central governments voluntarily give away power? More precisely, because modern democracies are organized around and run by political parties, why do parties that wield national-level power ever choose to reduce the scope of that power? I argue that nationalized parties sometimes devolve power to regional governments when voters in different regions cannot be satisfied through a single, national-level policy alone. This occurs when policy preferences in one or more regions are incompatible with those in the rest of the country. By devolving some decision-making authority to regional governments, a party may be able to accommodate differing policy preferences in different parts of the county and limit the damage to the party’s electoral fortunes such differences could create.
I primarily focus on the case of Scottish devolution in the United Kingdom, tracing the evolution of the British Labour Party's attitudes towards the issue. I argue that New Labour made devolution an integral part its platform in the mid-1990s because doing allowed the party to shift its economic policies rightward to compete with the Conservatives for English votes without losing Scottish votes to the left-leaning Scottish National Party. I develop a formal model representing the challenges a nationalized party faces when trying to win votes in more than one region of a country. I show that, as the preferences of voters in different regions diverge, a party may be able to win votes using a combination of policy and political decentralization when it would be unable to do so using a single national-level policy alone. After applying this model to the United Kingdom, I explore some if its implications using the cases of decentralization in Spain and Belgium.
Since the 1970s, several Western European democracies have devolved substantial decision-making powers to sub-national governments, some for the first time. Why do central governments voluntarily give away power? More precisely, because modern democracies are organized around and run by political parties, why do parties that wield national-level power ever choose to reduce the scope of that power? I argue that nationalized parties sometimes devolve power to regional governments when voters in different regions cannot be satisfied through a single, national-level policy alone. This occurs when policy preferences in one or more regions are incompatible with those in the rest of the country. By devolving some decision-making authority to regional governments, a party may be able to accommodate differing policy preferences in different parts of the county and limit the damage to the party’s electoral fortunes such differences could create.
I primarily focus on the case of Scottish devolution in the United Kingdom, tracing the evolution of the British Labour Party's attitudes towards the issue. I argue that New Labour made devolution an integral part its platform in the mid-1990s because doing allowed the party to shift its economic policies rightward to compete with the Conservatives for English votes without losing Scottish votes to the left-leaning Scottish National Party. I develop a formal model representing the challenges a nationalized party faces when trying to win votes in more than one region of a country. I show that, as the preferences of voters in different regions diverge, a party may be able to win votes using a combination of policy and political decentralization when it would be unable to do so using a single national-level policy alone. After applying this model to the United Kingdom, I explore some if its implications using the cases of decentralization in Spain and Belgium.
Working Papers
Why Nationalized Parties Support Regional Devolution: Theories and Evidence from the United Kingdom
Why do parties within a national-level government agree to give up power by creating or empowering sub-national governments? Focusing on nationalised parties -- those that run and gain support throughout a country -- I argue that nationalised parties may devolve power to regional governments when voters in different regions have preferences that are fundamentally incompatible with one another. By relinquishing some decision making power to regional governments, a party may be able to accommodate regionally diverging preferences and limit the damage to the party's electoral fortunes such differences could create. I present a spatial model showing that a nationalised party may be able to use a combination of national-level policy and devolution of power to regional governments to win votes when a single national-level policy alone would fail to do so. I illustrate the argument using the case of Scottish devolution in the United Kingdom. New Labour made devolution and integral party of its platform in the mid-1990s precisely so that the party could shift its economic policies to compete with the Conservative Party for English votes without losing Scottish votes to the left-leaning Scottish National Party.
Principle or Pressure? Distinguishing Party Discipline from Party Cohesion in the United Kingdom
Both party cohesion and discipline play important roles in maintaining legislator loyalty but because these factors are usually present simultaneously, it has been particularly difficult to analyze their influences independently. I take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in the
United Kingdom, studying former MPs who are elevated to the House of Lords. MPs face reelection and have the potential to hold positions of power in the government while Peers in the House of Lords are appointed for life and rarely hold senior cabinet positions. Thus, party whips in the House of Commons can increase loyalty by enforcing discipline when cohesion fails. Whips in the House of Lords must rely only on the latter. For all Peers who came from the House of Commons, I compare roll call behavior in each chamber and attribute changes in elevated former MPs’ voting records to the removal of party discipline. I find that under single party majority government, cohesion is often sufficient to maintain party-line voting. However, under the current coalition government, discipline is more often required.
Coalition Partners and Core Policy Preferences: Examining the Role of Catch-All and Niche Parties in Coalition Government
This paper looks at how coalitions function by differentiating between them based on the kinds of parties involved. Niche parties have strong policy positions and are less concerned about gaining seats while catch-all parties aim to gain seats and are often willing to compromise policy positions to do so. I argue that these differences between parties mean that when catch-all parties in government together, each will need to worry about their coalition partner stealing credit for their achievements. However, niche parties are less able to claim credit for the accomplishments of other groups so these concerns are minimized. I test this idea using budget data from the German states from 1991 to 2010. I look at both overall spending and an issue area strongly subject to credit claiming competition between catch-all parties—individual benefit transfers. I find that overall spending increases under coalitions between catch-all parties but coalitions that include one or more niche parties are not likely to spend significantly more than single party governments. On the other hand, spending on individual benefit transfers decreases the most under coalitions that include only catch-all parties. I argue that these results suggest that parties, when in coalition, focus more on policy issues where they will receive credit and are less inclined to undertake spending that will be reasonably subject to competing credit claiming.
Why do parties within a national-level government agree to give up power by creating or empowering sub-national governments? Focusing on nationalised parties -- those that run and gain support throughout a country -- I argue that nationalised parties may devolve power to regional governments when voters in different regions have preferences that are fundamentally incompatible with one another. By relinquishing some decision making power to regional governments, a party may be able to accommodate regionally diverging preferences and limit the damage to the party's electoral fortunes such differences could create. I present a spatial model showing that a nationalised party may be able to use a combination of national-level policy and devolution of power to regional governments to win votes when a single national-level policy alone would fail to do so. I illustrate the argument using the case of Scottish devolution in the United Kingdom. New Labour made devolution and integral party of its platform in the mid-1990s precisely so that the party could shift its economic policies to compete with the Conservative Party for English votes without losing Scottish votes to the left-leaning Scottish National Party.
Principle or Pressure? Distinguishing Party Discipline from Party Cohesion in the United Kingdom
Both party cohesion and discipline play important roles in maintaining legislator loyalty but because these factors are usually present simultaneously, it has been particularly difficult to analyze their influences independently. I take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in the
United Kingdom, studying former MPs who are elevated to the House of Lords. MPs face reelection and have the potential to hold positions of power in the government while Peers in the House of Lords are appointed for life and rarely hold senior cabinet positions. Thus, party whips in the House of Commons can increase loyalty by enforcing discipline when cohesion fails. Whips in the House of Lords must rely only on the latter. For all Peers who came from the House of Commons, I compare roll call behavior in each chamber and attribute changes in elevated former MPs’ voting records to the removal of party discipline. I find that under single party majority government, cohesion is often sufficient to maintain party-line voting. However, under the current coalition government, discipline is more often required.
Coalition Partners and Core Policy Preferences: Examining the Role of Catch-All and Niche Parties in Coalition Government
This paper looks at how coalitions function by differentiating between them based on the kinds of parties involved. Niche parties have strong policy positions and are less concerned about gaining seats while catch-all parties aim to gain seats and are often willing to compromise policy positions to do so. I argue that these differences between parties mean that when catch-all parties in government together, each will need to worry about their coalition partner stealing credit for their achievements. However, niche parties are less able to claim credit for the accomplishments of other groups so these concerns are minimized. I test this idea using budget data from the German states from 1991 to 2010. I look at both overall spending and an issue area strongly subject to credit claiming competition between catch-all parties—individual benefit transfers. I find that overall spending increases under coalitions between catch-all parties but coalitions that include one or more niche parties are not likely to spend significantly more than single party governments. On the other hand, spending on individual benefit transfers decreases the most under coalitions that include only catch-all parties. I argue that these results suggest that parties, when in coalition, focus more on policy issues where they will receive credit and are less inclined to undertake spending that will be reasonably subject to competing credit claiming.
